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Abstract
This thesis investigates the effects of judicial ideology and judge characteristics on sen-
tencing in human trafficking cases. Despite research on federal prosecutions of human
trafficking, almost nothing is known about sentencing for federal human trafficking of-
fenders. Previous research on sentencing has been limited by the lack of data linking
judges to specific sentencing decisions. Using new data that matches judges to defen-
dants convicted of federal human trafficking offenses, I observe that judicial ideology
has an effect on overall sentence length—but only for district court judges appointed by
Democratic presidents. I also find that partisan composition of the circuit court, rather
than ideology of the sentencing judge, affects the likelihood of downward departures
from the Sentencing Guidelines. When Democrat-appointed judges make up a major-
ity of the circuit court, district court judges are 2.1 times as likely to depart below the
Sentencing Guidelines. These findings confirm positive political theories of sentencing
that model judges as strategic decision makers within a “judicial hierarchy.”
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1 Introduction
Federal prosecutions of human trafficking in the United States have dramatically increased since
the passage of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) in 2000.1 According to Congress,
the explicit purpose of the TVPA was to “combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifesta-
tion of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective
punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims.”2 In fiscal year 2015, 160 defendants were
convicted for offenses related to the TVPA (Motivans & Snyder, 2018). By contrast, a total of 75
defendants were convicted for related offenses from fiscal years 2001 through 2005 (Motivans &
Kyckelhahn, 2006). Since 2000, various TVPA reauthorization acts have expanded the nature and
scope of the federal trafficking offenses. These statutory changes, in addition to the development of
multi-agency federal anti-trafficking task forces, have contributed to the increase in prosecutions.
In fiscal year 2018 alone, over 200 federal trafficking prosecutions were initiated (Department of
Justice, 2019). Despite the increase in federal prosecutions of trafficking, there is limited research
on specific actors in the criminal justice system.
Researchers have discussed the difficulties that prosecutors face as well as recent trends in fed-
eral prosecutions of human trafficking (Bracy, Lul, & Roe-Sepowitz, 2019; Clawson, Dutch, Lopez,
& Tiapula, 2008). But we lack a rigorous empirical understanding of a crucial actor—judges—in
studying federal human trafficking prosecutions. In this thesis, I examine factors that influence
judicial sentencing of defendants convicted of trafficking offenses.3 In doing so, I first conduct
a preliminary analysis of human trafficking offenders sentenced from 2009-2018, with discussion
of specific demographic and case characteristics. Then, I analyze a dataset that links judges to
sentencing data.
As Cohen and Yang (2019) explain, previous research on judicial sentencing “has been compli-
cated by the lack of data linking judge identifiers to defendant characteristics and case outcomes.”
As a result, previous researchers have used court-level variation in the percent of Democratic or
Republican appointed judges to study federal sentencing. But research using aggregate court-level
1 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Public L. No. 106–386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000).
2 22 U.S.C. §7101(a) (codifying the Trafficking Victims Protection Act).
3 This thesis studies sentencing. But there is a normative question as to whether lengthy prison sentences for human traf-
ficking offenses are always appropriate. Little is known, for instance, about the deterrent effect of mandatory minimum
penalties for certain forms of sex trafficking. Moreover, recent surveys of survivors of human trafficking suggest that
justice for survivors does not always come in the form of long terms of incarceration for their traffickers (Yu, Husse-
mann, Love, McCoy, & Owens, 2018). Some survivors, for example, emphasized the importance of rehabilitation and
educational opportunities. Studying sentencing is not to displace these important discussions about restorative justice in
the context of human trafficking.
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data may be biased by certain unobservables that are correlated with partisan composition. Indeed,
recent research using a large dataset of sentencing decisions linked with specific judges show results
that are not entirely consistent with previous studies that use court-level analysis (Cohen & Yang,
2019). For this thesis, I create a new dataset linking over 800 defendants in human trafficking cases
from 76 federal districts to specific case and docket records. To study political ideology, I improve
upon existing research by using a continuous measure of judicial ideology developed by Bonica and
Sen (2017), in addition to the party affiliation of the appointing president.4 Using this methodology,
it is possible to study ideological differences in judges appointed by presidents from the same party.
In general, previous studies on sentencing have not investigated the effects that partisan composi-
tion of the circuit court may have. In studying the effects of circuit court ideology, this thesis tests
positive political theories of sentencing that model judges as strategic actors within a hierarchy.
This thesis contributes to the varied literature discussing the impact of judicial ideology and
judge characteristics on sentencing decisions. This research is also related to the empirical study
of human trafficking prosecutions in the United States. The remainder of the paper is structured as
follows. The next section provides brief overviews of the federal sentencing process, sentencing
in the context of human trafficking cases, and previous empirical research on judicial sentencing.
Section III discusses theories of criminal sentencing. In section IV, I explain the data sources and
empirical methodology. A preliminary analysis using the unmatched dataset is presented in Section
V. An analysis of the matched dataset is presented in Section VI. Section VII presents the main
results and Section VIII discusses relevant implications.
2 Background
In this section, I provide an overview of the federal sentencing process. I also briefly discuss sen-
tencing for human trafficking offenders and describe the relevant statutes. Finally, I review the
literature on judicial sentencing, using studies from both state courts and federal courts. For this
thesis, I focus on judicial ideology, gender, and race. But due to the limited number of female and
minority judges in my final dataset, I primarily focus on the effects of ideology.
4 Chief Justice John Roberts has said that “[w]e do not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton
judges” (Liptak, 2018). In this thesis, I follow virtually all of the previous empirical studies on sentencing in using party
affiliation of the appointing president as a proxy for judicial ideology. That is not to say that judges are partisan, but that
there are observed differences in judicial-decision making depending on party affiliation of the appointing president. In
a recent interview, Maya Sen explains that “[t]he empirical evidence is really clear that judges who are appointed by
Republicans tend to vote and rule and write opinions in a more conservative direction. And judges who are appointed
by Democratic presidents tend to rule and vote and write opinions in a more left-leaning direction” (Shapiro, 2018).
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2.1 Federal Sentencing
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, first implemented in 1987, created a uniform system to sentence
criminal defendants.5 Before the Guidelines, judges were granted substantial discretion in imposing
sentences. In 2005, the United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, which
made the mandatory federal Guidelines merely advisory.6 As a result, federal judges now have
greater discretion in the context of sentencing. Sentencing post-Booker proceeds in a three step
process (United States Sentencing Commission, 2018). First, the court calculates the appropriate
sentencing range provided by the Guidelines. At this stage, the judge may make a variety of law
and fact-based determinations that relate to aggravating or mitigating features in the Sentencing
Guidelines. Second, judges determine whether there is any basis in the Guidelines Manual to depart
from the Guidelines. In order to depart, judges must reach legal considerations in addition to certain
factual findings. For the most part, departures are reviewed with a stricter standard than adjustments
described in the first step. Finally, courts consider §3553(a) factors (statutory factors that Congress
established as general tenets of reasonableness) in deciding the final sentence.7 Figure 1 provides
an outline of the sentencing process.
that have been either proscribed by the Sentencing Commission or considered
by the Sentencing Commission. Circuit courts have both reversed and upheld
district court departures that were based, for example, on family history, post-
arrest rehabilitation, family responsibility, health, and exemplary military ser-
vice.21 Although undoubtedly there are factual determinations to be made in
a departure, what distinguishes a departure from an adjustment is the added
legal conclusion that the type of circumstances involved in the case was not
addressed by Guideline factors.
The prosecution can appeal a downward departure from the Sentencing
Table to the overseeing circuit court, and the defendant, similarly, can appeal
an upward departure.22 If the district court judge makes a departure, the circuit
court can reverse the district court on the threshold legal finding of whether the
Guidelines already incorporate the circumstances relied on by the sentencing
judge and whether or not the circumstances, even if not covered by the Guide-
lines, are sufficiently unusual to warrant a departure. The appellate review
of the legal conclusion underlying a departure is governed by an abuse of
discretion standard—a standard allowing the circuit court to be more exact-
ing and less deferential than the clear error standard used for review of factual
determinations. The flowchart in Figure 1 illustrates the sentencing process.
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Figure 1. Sentencing Process.
21. See Stith and Cabranes (1998, 100), for examples of departures rejected by circuit courts.
22. We note that the prosecution itself can facilitate downward departures by moving for
a ‘‘substantial assistance’’ downward departure based on the offender’s cooperation in prosecuting
other offenders, and judges can only grant substantial assistance departures on such a motion of the
prosecution. As a check, some of the empirical analyses below remove substantial assistance
departures from the sample on the theory that the prosecution has significant control over the sen-
tence at this point and, consequently, the judges’ preferences should matter less.
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Figure 1: Sentencing model from Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007)
5 The Guidelines were created by the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC). The USSC was created by the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, an i portant statute that limited t e discretion of federal ju ges. The Sentencing
Guidelines were designed to ensure grea er unifo mity in criminal sentencing. However, Stith and Cabranes (1998)
provide an argument against the mandatory Guidelines system.
6 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
7 Considerations include the nature of the offense, public safety, and deterrence.
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As shown, adjustments are reviewed for clear error and departures are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Clear error is a “significantly deferential” standard. A court characterized clear error
in the following way, “[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s
choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”8 Departures, on the other hand, involve legal
conclusions that are reviewable for abuse of discretion.9 In short, the abuse of discretion standard is
less deferential than the clear error standard. In determining the sentencing range according to the
Guidelines, judges consider the base offense level and the characteristics of the specific offense. The
presumptive sentencing range, after the final offense level and criminal history category have been
determined, is shown by the sentencing table below. For example, a base offense level of 30 with a
criminal history category of III would lead to a sentencing range of 121-151 months in prison.
 
SENTENCING TABLE 
(in months of imprisonment) 
  Criminal History Category  (Criminal History Points) 
 
Offense 
Level 
I 
(0 or 1) 
II 
(2 or 3) 
 III 
(4, 5, 6) 
 IV 
(7, 8, 9) 
 V 
(10, 11, 12) 
 VI 
(13 or more) 
            
Zone A 
1 0–6 0–6  0–6  0–6  0–6  0–6 
2 0–6 0–6  0–6  0–6  0–6  1–7 
3 0–6 0–6  0–6  0–6  2–8  3–9 
4 0–6 0–6  0–6  2–8  4–10  6–12 
5 0–6 0–6  1–7  4–10  6–12  9–15 
6 0–6 1–7  2–8  6–12  9–15  12–18 
7 0–6 2–8  4–10  8–14  12–18  15–21 
8 0–6 4–10  6–12  10–16  15–21  18–24 
Zone B 
9 4–10 6–12  8–14  12–18  18–24  21–27 
10 6–12 8–14  10–16  15–21  21–27  24–30 
11 8–14 10–16  12–18  18–24  24–30  27–33 
 
Zone C 
 
12 10–16 12–18  15–21  21–27  27–33  30–37 
13 12–18 15–21  18–24  24–30  30–37  33–41 
Zone D 
14 15–21 18–24  21–27  27–33  33–41  37–46 
15 18–24 21–27  24–30  30–37  37–46  41–51 
16 21–27 24–30  27–33  33–41  41–51  46–57 
17 24–30 27–33  30–37  37–46  46–57  51–63 
18 27–33 30–37  33–41  41–51  51–63  57–71 
19 30–37 33–41  37–46  46–57  57–71  63–78 
20 33–41 37–46  41–51  51–63  63–78  70–87 
21 37–46 41–51  46–57  57–71  70–87  77–96 
22 41–51 46–57  51–63  63–78  77–96  84–105 
23 46–57 51–63  57–71  70–87  84–105  92–115 
24 51–63 57–71  63–78  77–96  92–115  100–125 
25 57–71 63–78  70–87  84–105  100–125  110–137 
26 63–78 70–87  78–97  92–115  110–137  120–150 
27 70–87 78–97  87–108  100–125  120–150  130–162 
28 78–97 87–108  97–121  110–137  130–162  140–175 
29 87–108 97–121  108–135  121–151  140–175  151–188 
30 97–121 108–135  121–151  135–168  151–188  168–210 
31 108–135 121–151  135–168  151–188  168–210  188–235 
32 121–151 135–168  151–188  168–210  188–235  210–262 
33 135–168 151–188  168–210  188–235  210–262  235–293 
34 151–188 168–210  188–235  210–262  235–293  262–327 
35 168–210 188–235  210–262  235–293  262–327  292–365 
36 188–235 210–262  235–293  262–327  292–365  324–405 
37 210–262 235–293  262–327  292–365  324–405  360–life 
38 235–293 262–327  292–365  324–405  360–life  360–life 
39 262–327 292–365  324–405  360–life  360–life  360–life 
40 292–365 324–405  360–life  360–life  360–life  360–life 
41 324–405 360–life  360–life  360–life  360–life  360–life 
42 360–life 360–life  360–life  360–life  360–life  360–life 
43 life life  life  life  life  life 
 
November 1, 2016 
Figure 2: Sentencing table from the USSC
8 United States v. Riggs, 370 F.3d 382 (4th Cir. 2004), citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City 470 U.S. 564 (1985).
9 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
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2.2 Sentencing for Human Trafficking Offenders
The TVPA introduced significant criminal penalties for human trafficking offenses with sentences
up to life imprisonment. After the passage of the TVPA, Congress has repeatedly increased crim-
inal sentences for sex trafficking, amounting to a “get tough” policy (Albonetti, 2014). Some of
these changes were not necessarily amendments to the TVPA. For example, the Adam Walsh Child
Protection Act of 2006 created a new 15-year mandatory minimum penalty for sex trafficking of
children under the age of 14.10 Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines made by the
Sentencing Commission have also increased the penalties for sex trafficking.11
Title 18, Chapter 77 of the United States code is titled “Peonage, Slavery, and Trafficking in
Persons.” Chapter 77 criminalizes several distinct offenses—including forced labor as well as sex
trafficking. The term human trafficking is not entirely precise since the statutes themselves refer
only to “sex trafficking” or “forced labor.” At the core, Chapter 77 offenses criminalize various
forms of exploitation. Many Chapter 77 offenses specifically highlight “means of force, threats of
force, fraud, [or] coercion.”12 Acts that may be criminalized under Chapter 77 include compelled or
coerced labor as well as coerced commercial sex. For minor sex trafficking, force, fraud, or coercion
does not need to be proved (commercial sexual exploitation of minors is criminalized conduct under
Chapter 77). Moreover, the language of “trafficking” is perhaps misleading. Chapter 77 does not
require movement or criminal smuggling.13 Someone who knowingly recruits an individual and
causes that individual to engage in a commercial sex act violates §1591. Someone who knowingly
benefits from participation in a sex trafficking venture also violates §1591. Finally, someone who
conspires to or attempts to violate certain Chapter 77 offenses violates §1594.14
A further complication is that some “human trafficking” cases do not involve Chapter 77 statutes.
Some cases involve charges under interstate prostitution statutes, such as the Mann Act statutes or
the Travel Act.15 But these statutes criminalize different kinds of conduct—sex buyers, for exam-
ple, might be charged with interstate prostitution offenses. For this thesis, I only include cases that
involve convictions under Chapter 77 statutes. This likely results in a subset of the actual number
10 Public L. No. 109–248, §208, 120 Stat. 615 (2006).
11 For example, Amendment 701 provides a new base offense level of 34 for convictions of 18 U.S.C. §1591(b)(1) in
§2G1.1, in response to the mandatory minimum created by the Adam Walsh Act.
12 18 U.S.C. §1591(a)(2).
13 This may be contrary to some publicly accepted definitions of trafficking. A recent public opinion survey found that
most participants viewed trafficking as involving smuggling (Bonilla & Mo, 2019).
14 18 U.S.C. §1594.
15 These statutes may include 18 U.S.C. §§2421, 2422, 2423, 2425 and 18 U.S.C. §1952.
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of human trafficking cases. However, limiting the analysis to Chapter 77 offenses allows for more
consistent comparisons of sentence length. In this thesis, I use the term “human trafficking” to refer
to mainly to Chapter 77 offenses.
For the most part, the offenses described in this thesis fall into Zone D of the sentencing grid
(Figure 2). There are two statutory minimums that apply in the context of human trafficking. The
first mandatory minimum applies to sex trafficking of children under the age of 14 or sex trafficking
that is effected by means of force, fraud, or coercion. The second mandatory minimum applies to
sex trafficking of children under the age of 18 but above the age of 14. The following mandatory
minimums for §1591(b) are presented below.
Sex trafficking of children under 14 or by force, fraud, or coercion: if the offense
was effected by means of force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion described in sub-
section (e)(2), or by any combination of such means, or if the person recruited, enticed,
harbored, transported, provided, obtained, advertised, patronized, or solicited had not
attained the age of 14 years at the time of such offense, by a fine under this title and
imprisonment for any term of years not less than 15 or for life;
Sex trafficking of children under 18: if the offense was not so effected, and the person
recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, advertised, patronized, or
solicited had attained the age of 14 years but had not attained the age of 18 years at the
time of such offense, by a fine under this title and imprisonment for not less than 10
years or for life.16
In the context of human trafficking, only sex trafficking has statutory minimums. There are
no mandatory minimum penalties for the various forms of labor trafficking. In addition, penalties
for sex trafficking are distinct from penalties for labor trafficking—even when the labor trafficking
involves victims under the age of 18. Compare, for example, the statutory text for §1589.
Forced labor: Whoever violates this section shall be fined under this title, imprisoned
not more than 20 years, or both. If death results from a violation of this section, or if
the violation includes kidnapping, an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an
attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for any term of
years or life, or both.17
The important point is that criminal sentencing for sex trafficking is not analogous to crimi-
nal sentencing for forced labor, and there may be substantial differences in sentence length. The
disanalogy extends to considerations under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The relevant Sen-
tencing Guideline for sex trafficking offenses is §2G1.1.18 According to §2G1.1(a), the base offense
16 18 U.S.C. §1591(b).
17 18 U.S.C. §1589.
18 United States Sentencing Guidelines §2G1.1.
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level is 34 if the offense of conviction is §1591(b)(1) and 14 if otherwise. Currently, convictions
for sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion and convictions for sex trafficking of minors carry
base offense levels of thirty-four. As shown by the sentencing table, the base offense level of 34
is high—sentences range from 151 to 327 months. In contrast, §2H4.1 governs the sentencing of
labor trafficking.19 For forced labor, the base offense level is 22, which results in a sentence range
between 41 to 105 months. For conspiracy charges under §1594, there is some controversy over
the applicable base level offense. §2X1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which covers conspiracies,
attempts, and solicitations, seems to indicate that the appropriate offense level is the base offense
level of the substantive offense. According to the sentencing guideline, conspiracy to violate §1591
has a base offense level of 34. But on the other hand, the 9th Circuit has concluded that 14 is
the appropriate base offense level for a defendant convicted of sex trafficking conspiracy under
§2G1.1(a)(2).20
Given these complexities, it is unclear how federal district judges approach sentencing in the
context of human trafficking. It is helpful to start with a somewhat analogous case study—the sen-
tencing of defendants convicted of child pornography charges. In the last few decades, Congress has
increased federal penalties for child pornography and expanded criminal statutes (Hamilton, 2011).
Like sex trafficking, there are various statutorily established mandatory minimums. For instance,
child pornography production has a mandatory minimum of 15 years and distribution/receipt of
child pornography has a mandatory minimum of 5 years.21 Judges have limited discretion in de-
parting from the mandatory minimum sentence. Apart from cases involving government initiated
substantial assistance motions, judges generally cannot depart below the statutory minimum sen-
tence.
The United States Sentencing Commission has expressed opposition to the increasingly puni-
tive child pornography sentencing. Federal judges have also expressed some opposition. A 2010
survey from the US Sentencing Commission found that about 70% of federal district court judges
consider the sentences for child pornography possession and receipt to be too severe (United States
Sentencing Commission, 2010). A number of specific judges have exercised discretion in reducing
sentences for individuals convicted of certain child pornography offenses (Hamilton, 2011; Kaiser
& Spohn, 2014; Steiker, 2013). But other judges have complied with the existing sentencing ranges.
19 United States Sentencing Guidelines §2H4.1.
20 United States v. Wei Lin, 841 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 2016). Contra the Wei Lin court, Richmond (2017) argues that
the correct base offense level is 14 and “[the Lin court] effectively rewrote the Guidelines.”
21 18 U.S.C. § 2256.
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Comparing child pornography sentencing to sentencing for other federal offenses, researchers find
that the prevalence of downward departures in child pornography sentencing cannot be fully ac-
counted for by differences in judicial characteristics. This suggests that some judges may be using
discretion to remedy perceived injustice in the Sentencing Guidelines (Kaiser & Spohn, 2014). In
the context of child pornography sentencing, there is substantial variance in the length of sentences.
This is further complicated by the fact that circuit courts have varied in their response to the Guide-
lines, with some appellate courts strongly advising judges to reject applicable Guidelines (Steiker,
2013). In contrast, there has not been sustained opposition to human trafficking sentencing due to
the comparatively small number of cases prosecuted each year. But child pornography sentencing
suggests that there may substantial variance in the length of trafficking sentences due to substantial
penalties and varied judicial responses. Additionally, the nature of the criminal activity that is crim-
inalized under Chapter 77 is extremely varied. In order to account for large potential differences in
sentence length, departures will be studied alongside sentence length in this thesis.
2.3 Judicial Ideology and Judge Characteristics
There has been considerable research investigating factors that may impact judicial decision-making.
Frequently studied factors include judge ideology or political affiliation, gender, and race (Boyd &
Nelson, 2017; Schanzenbach & Tiller, 2007, 2008; Steffensmeier & Hebert, 1999). Sentencing de-
cisions are primarily determined by the level of offense and the criminal history of the defendant.
But judge based factors may influence sentencing—both the calculation of the Guidelines range and
the final sentence. Research on the political ideology of judges has found that judges appointed by
Republican presidents give longer sentences compared to judges appointed by Democrat presidents
(Schanzenbach & Tiller, 2007, 2008).22 Cohen and Yang (2019) study the racial gap in sentence
length by judge political affiliation. They find that Republican-appointed judges sentenced black
defendants to 3 more months than similar non-blacks, relative to Democrat-appointed judges. Other
researchers have found that the sentencing disparity by judge political affiliation is especially salient
in the context of so-called “street crimes,” which include violent, theft, and drug offenses. In con-
trast, Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007) find that sentencing differences based on political affiliation
may not exist for certain crimes including white collar and environmental offenses (Schanzenbach &
Tiller, 2007). In addition, the ideology of the supervising circuit court may also influence decisions
22 However, it is important to note that the existence of differences in sentence length by political affiliation does not
speak to whether the sentences imposed are warranted, fair, or correct.
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by district judges. Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007) find that Democrat-appointed judges give lower
sentences when politically aligned with they are the circuit court. That is, when a majority of the
circuit court are also Democrat-appointees, sentences given by Democrat-appointed district court
judges are lower (compared to when a majority of the circuit court are Republican-appointees).
Other factors that may influence decision-making include judge gender and race. Empirical
evidence on the effects of gender on sentencing is mixed. Some studies have found that women
sentence defendants more harshly (Steffensmeier & Hebert, 1999). But other studies have found
that while male and female judges do not generally sentence defendants differently, female judges
are more lenient when sentencing female defendants (Boyd & Nelson, 2017). Empirical evidence
on the effects of race is similarly mixed (Abrams, Bertrand, & Mullainathan, 2012; Steffensmeier
& Britt, 2001; Uhlman, 1978; Welch, Combs, & Gruhl, 1988).
Judicial attributes affect sentencing in various ways. One explanation for why there are differ-
ences depending on political affiliation is that Democratic-appointed judges are more sympathetic
to defendants’ rights (Tiede, Carp, & Manning, 2010). However, previous studies have shown that
the strength of this policy preference depends on the nature of the criminal offense. It is not known
exactly how judges may view human trafficking offenses in relation to other offenses. Public opin-
ion polling suggests that although there is almost unanimous agreement that human trafficking is
morally reprehensible, a majority of respondents believed that the vast majority of victims were
female (not necessarily true, especially for labor trafficking) and human trafficking involves smug-
gling (not true) (Bonilla & Mo, 2019). It is unclear how public opinion on human trafficking may
affect judge decision-making and whether judges view human trafficking in the same way as the
general public.23 For federal judges (who are not elected), “the same forces that influence public
opinion may influence judges simply because they are members of the public too” (Posner, Epstein,
& Landes, 2013). And so, the general public’s definition of human trafficking as nearly synonymous
with the smuggling of women for sexual slavery may suggest that there are sentencing differences
between sex trafficking and forced labor sentencing. However, conventional wisdom suggests that
Democrat-appointed judges will give shorter sentences compared to Republican-appointed judges
for human trafficking offenses (Schanzenbach & Tiller, 2007).
Judge gender may also have an effect on sentencing in human trafficking cases. Human traffick-
ing, for example, have been described by some scholars as a “women’s issue” (Bouche´ & Wittmer,
23 Various studies have disagreed about the effects of public opinion on judicial decision-making (Boyd & Nelson, 2017;
Cook, 1977; Kritzer, 1979).
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2015). This perception is strongly mediated by public framing and media representations of traf-
ficking (DeStefano, 2007; Farrell & Fahy, 2009; Weitzer, 2006). Moreover, human trafficking is a
gendered crime, with substantially more male defendants than female defendants and substantially
more female victims than male victims. Additionally, previous research has found that female rep-
resentation in state legislatures is correlated with more comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation
(Bouche´ & Wittmer, 2015). In the context of judging, it has been shown that female judges have
shown a greater willingness to vote for the injured (majority female) party in civil sex discrimi-
nation cases (Boyd, Epstein, & Martin, 2010).24 And so, female judges may be more sympathetic
towards victims in human trafficking cases.25 But this does not necessarily imply that female judges
give longer sentences to traffickers. It is perhaps likely that female judges give female defendants
shorter sentences. For male defendants, female judges may give longer sentences relative to male
judges for human trafficking offenses. However, I believe that the overall effect of gender on sen-
tence length is likely small or nonexistent. Various studies have suggested that, at the trial level,
judicial characteristics like gender and race do not strongly influence sentencing decisions. Instead,
the judicial recruitment and socialization process result in similar decision-making across gender
and racial categories (Gibson, 1983; Uhlman, 1978).
3 Sentencing Theory
According to the hydraulic discretion theory, sentencing is a zero-sum situation in which attempts
to reduce judicial discretion likely increase prosecutorial discretion.26 Increased prosecutorial dis-
cretion may result in a net increase in certain racial or gender disparities. Indeed, given the sub-
stantial sentences for sex trafficking, prosecutors have considerable leverage in charging individuals
(Spohn, 2014).27 It is difficult to isolate the effect that judges may have. Sentencing decisions may
24 In contrast, Gruhl, Spohn, and Welch (1981) which find that women judges were more likely to sentence female
defendants to prison. And previous research using sexual assault case data from the Detroit Recorder’s Court find that
female judges did not sentence differently from male judges (Spohn, 1991).
25 Judicial empathy has been identified by Glynn and Sen (2015). Using a kinship relations to model personal experiences,
they find that judges with daughters are more likely to vote for certain issues.
26 For example, Starr and Rehavi, state that the hydraulic theory is “described as a near-consensus view of sentencing
scholars” (Starr & Rehavi, 2013). Other studies also rely in some degree on the hydraulic theory (Miethe, 1987;
Shermer & Johnson, 2010; Yang, 2015).
27 For example, it is difficult to account for plea agreements pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Fed. R Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C)). These plea agreements, known as sentence bargains, allow the government
and the defendant to agree to a specific sentence. And so, judicial discretion may be entirely limited in some instances.
These plea agreements are not indicated in the U.S. Sentencing Commission data. Thus, it is possible that judges may
appear to depart from the guidelines (according to USSC data) when in actuality, the defendant accepted a binding
sentence plea.
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be strongly influenced by the arguments that prosecutors make, even when controlling for prosecu-
torial discretion (such as by controlling for plea bargains and excluding government initiated depar-
tures). According to traditional attitudinal models of judging, judges are assumed to advance policy
goals through their decision-making. However, it is also important to consider the institutional con-
text that judges operate in. District court judges, for example, may be constrained by the policy
preferences of the supervising appellate court (Haire, Songer, & Lindquist, 2003). Appellate courts
may advance their policy preferences by reversing lower court decisions. District court judges may
have a desire to avoid such reversals. Indeed, Posner et al. (2013) have found evidence of “reversal
aversion” among district judges in the context of criminal sentencing. Hydraulic theory, however,
is compatible with a theory of judges as existing within the “judicial hierarchy.”28 In the context
of criminal sentencing, judicial discretion may be constrained by prosecutorial decision-making as
well as the hierarchy in which district court judges operate.
3.1 Positive Political Theory of Sentencing
Building upon previous studies from the judicial hierarchy literature, Schanzenbach and Tiller
(2007) propose a positive political theory of criminal sentencing that models judges as strategic
policy maximizers that anticipate potential responses by the overseeing circuit court.29 The follow-
ing positive political theory of judicial sentencing is presented:
Instrument Choice Theory: Judges are modeled as strategic policy makers who rou-
tinely manipulate doctrines, procedures, and other decision instruments to advance their
preferred policies. Judges can make a variety of fact and law-oriented decisions to de-
termine the presumptive sentencing range under the Guidelines. Judges may also depart
from the Guidelines, but this invites greater scrutiny from circuit courts (Schanzenbach
& Tiller, 2007).
For a variety of reasons, judges seek to avoid reversals of decisions (Baum, 1994). In the context
of criminal sentencing, the desire to avoid reversals suggests that judges will use differing “instru-
ments” to advance their sentencing policy preferences. For example, one instrument is to depart
from the Guidelines. Another instrument is to use fact-oriented adjustments in the determination of
28 Various scholars have discussed judicial hierarchy in different contexts (Johnson, 2006; Songer, Segal, & Cameron,
1994; Zorn & Bowie, 2010).
29 By strategic, I take Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007) to mean that district court judges take into account the decisions or
policy preferences of circuit courts in making their own decisions. The strategic account of judging has been discussed
by recent survey articles. These articles have provided evidence that judicial behavior is consistent with the assumption
of strategic judging. And strategic judging may be a valuable assumption for studying district court decision making.
For example, Epstein and Knight (2000) suggest that “the strategic account could be of enormous value in helping us
to understand politics on [district courts].”
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the Sentencing Guidelines range. But because departures invite a stricter level of review by the cir-
cuit court, the ideological composition of the higher court may influence the choice of instrument.
For example, when the overseeing circuit court is ideologically conservative, more liberal district
judges may use adjustments—rather than departures—to advance their sentencing preferences. The
instrument choice theory makes three important predictions about sentencing. First, judges advance
policy preferences through the determination of the sentencing range and the final sentence. Judges
may have limited ability to exercise discretion in certain factual determinations under the Guide-
lines. However, the language of the Guidelines is often vague, even in the context of sex and labor
trafficking.30 For example, if a sex trafficking offense involved criminal sexual abuse, the Guide-
lines provide that the base level offense should be increased “[i]f the victim was in the custody,
care, or supervisory control of the defendant.”31 What counts as supervisory control is understand-
ably vague. As a more general example, consider the sentencing enhancement for obstruction of
justice, which turns on whether the defendants’ actions “significantly impeded” the investigation.32
Second, the instrument choice theory predicts that the use of departures is influenced by the ideol-
ogy of the supervising circuit court. Third, the theory predicts that political alignment between a
district judge and the overseeing circuit court has an effect on sentencing length.
3.2 Hypotheses
In accordance with the predictions discussed above, the following hypotheses are presented:
Hypothesis 1A: More liberal judges give shorter sentences relative to more conserva-
tive judges for human trafficking offenses.
Hypothesis 1B: Female judges do not give substantially longer sentences relative to
male judges for human trafficking offenses.
For the reasons explained above, it is believed that more liberal judges will give lower sentences.
This is consistent with the findings from several recent studies on judicial ideology (Cohen & Yang,
2019; Schanzenbach & Tiller, 2007). Although human trafficking offenses do not neatly fall into
the existing categories studied by sentencing scholars, it is believed that liberal judges prefer shorter
sentences.
30 Stith and Cabranes (1998) discuss the complexity of the Guidelines system.
31 United States Sentencing Guidelines §2A3.1.
32 Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007) discuss §3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.
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The overall effect of judge gender is likely more complicated. For example, female judges, rel-
ative to male judges, may give longer sentences for male trafficking offenders and shorter sentences
for female trafficking offenders. But in general, 1B is believed to hold due to the limited number of
female defendants sentenced by female judges.
Hypothesis 2: More liberal judges are more likely to depart below the sentencing range
relative to more conservative judges for human trafficking offenses.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1A, it is believed that more liberal judges are also more likely to
depart below the Guidelines range. And consistent with the instrument choice theory, liberal judges
may use a variety of tools to advance their preferred sentencing policy preferences. For Hypotheses
1 and 2, judicial ideology will be modeled using a continuous measure. Previous studies have used
political party of the appointing president to study ideology, so this thesis improves by using a more
fine-grained approach to studying individual judge ideology.
Hypothesis 3A: Democrat-appointed judges give shorter sentences when politically
aligned with the circuit court compared to when Democrat-appointed judges are not
aligned.
Hypothesis 3B: Republican-appointed judges give longer sentences when politically
aligned with the circuit court compared to when Republican-appointed judges are not
aligned.
Finally, 3A suggests that when Democrat-appointed judges are aligned with the circuit court—
that is, when the circuit court is comprised of a majority of Democrat-appointees in the year
of sentencing—defendants will receive shorter sentences compared to when Democrat-appointed
judges are not aligned. And 3B suggests that the political alignment effect holds for Republican-
appointed judges. These hypotheses are consistent with the recent positive political theory of ju-
dicial sentencing in Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007), which assumes that judges exist within an
established hierarchy. While Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007) provide and test a positive political
theory of judging, but they do so using a dataset that is not linked to specific judges. Instead, they
use district court-level variation in the percent of Democrat or Republican appointees. Although
the sample I will use is much smaller, data on specific judges (such as ideological measures) will
provide valuable insight into the relationship between ideology and sentencing.
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4 Data and Methodology
4.1 Data Sources
Two datasets were created for this thesis.33 The preliminary dataset is created using the sentencing
datafiles from the United States Sentencing Commission. The dataset spans fiscal years 2009 to
2018 (October 1, 2008 to September 30, 2018) and consists of 1,230 defendants convicted of a rele-
vant human trafficking offense. For the purposes of this thesis, a relevant human trafficking offense
consists of the following violations: 18 U.S. Code §§1589; 1590; 1591; 1592; 1594. These statutes
include both labor trafficking as well as sex trafficking. The preliminary dataset allows for a descrip-
tive analysis of human trafficking sentencing in this time period without subsetting to any particular
type of defendant. Data from the USSC included defendant demographic information such as age,
gender, race/ethnicity, citizenship status, and prior criminal history. Other relevant variables in-
clude the disposition of the case (such as whether the defendant pleaded guilty or the case went to
trial), year and month of sentencing, district court where the defendant was sentenced, number of
counts of conviction, the Guidelines calculation, the final sentence in months, and whether restitu-
tion was ordered. The main advantage of this dataset is that it allows for a more “complete picture”
of offender characteristics in human trafficking prosecutions in the past decade. This improves on
the methodology employed by Denton (2016), which uses a specific population of offenders in a
cluster-sampling design. Judge identifiers, however, are redacted from the USSC dataset.
The final dataset was constructed in two steps. First, I match the USSC dataset with proprietary
case-level data from the Human Trafficking Legal Center (HTLC). The HTLC data was manually
coded from accessing “Public Access to Court Electronic Records” (PACER) and includes informa-
tion on judge identifiers. Judge data was then linked to the HTLC data by matching on district court
of sentencing, month and year of sentencing, and fuzzy matching on total prison sentence. Dupli-
cates were removed from the dataset based on additional criteria including defendant age, defendant
sex, and amount of restitution ordered, if ordered. Additional case information was accessed and
manually coded. The HTLC dataset, when matched with the sentencing data and the judge data,
resulted in a final dataset of 834 defendants, a match rate of 67.8%. Then, the merged dataset was
linked with judge ideology data from Bonica and Sen (2017). Summary statistics are presented for
both the preliminary dataset and the final dataset.
33 The institutional review board at The Ohio State University deemed this study exempt because it relied on publicly
accessible data. The final matched dataset is also de-identified by excluding defendant names.
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4.2 Methodology
After Booker, the proportion of sentences that were within the Guidelines range decreased, while
the proportion of downward departures and above departures increased (United States Sentencing
Commission, 2012; Yang, 2014). This thesis focuses on the post-Booker period. More specifically,
this thesis focuses on the period from FY 2009 to FY 2018. There are two reasons for doing so.
First, there is less variability in the median prison sentence from year to year compared to the
pre-Booker period. Median sentences for sex trafficking and forced labor offenses have generally
increased since the passage of the TVPA. This may be due to changes in the legislative record. For
example, Albonetti (2014) found that Congress sought to substantially increase penalties for human
trafficking offenses in the period from 2001 to 2010. In the past few years, sentences have roughly
stabilized. Second, there is less variability in the range of sentences in a given year. The distribution
of sentences by year will be discussed in the following section.
Previous studies on sentencing have conceptualized sentencing as a two step process (Ro-
driguez, Curry, & Lee, 2006; Steffensmeier & Britt, 2001). First, there is a decision whether to
incarcerate. Second, there is a decision regarding the total prison term. Another common approach
treats nonincarcerative sentences as censored values. In this thesis, it is not helpful to character-
ize sentencing as a bifurcated process or to exclude nonincarcerative sentences. This is due to the
fact that almost all the defendants are given a sentence (although some were sentenced to relatively
short sentences). Unlike other offenses, there are almost no nonincarcerative sentences in the human
trafficking defendant dataset.
In empirical studies, authors have attempted to eliminate the potential impact of prosecuto-
rial discretion by controlling for the Sentencing Guidelines. But as Starr and Rehavi point out,
the Guidelines are subject to a complex procedure of charging, fact-finding, plea-bargaining, and
Guidelines fact-finding. This results in a failure to accurately model the effect of judicial discretion
on sentencing outcomes. Cohen and Yang account for potential increases in prosecutorial discretion
by accounting for the charging and application of mandatory minimums and the application of gov-
ernment sponsored departures (such as 5K1.1 substantial assistance departures). However, this may
not entirely account for potential exercises of prosecutorial discretion. This thesis, in contrast to
other studies like Shermer and Johnson (2010); Starr and Rehavi (2013) which have taken a broader
approach by expanding data analysis to include certain procedural steps involved in sentencing,
takes a more narrow approach. Specifically, this thesis creates two additional dependent variables
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based on existing Guidelines data: (1) departure in months from the Guidelines maximum and (2)
departure in months from the Guidelines minimum (mandatory minimums are included).34 With
these measures, it is possible to measure the amount of judicial discretion within a certain Guide-
lines range. To clarify, these are not necessarily departures from the Guidelines themselves. For
example, a defendant might have a Guidelines range of 151-188 months in prison. If the defendant
is sentenced to 160 months in prison, the value of (1) is -28 months. The value of (2) is 9 months.
Moreover, the calculation of (2) will include applicable mandatory minimums. Using the same ex-
ample, if there is a mandatory minimum of 180 months, the effective Guidelines range is 180-188
months. This approach allows for a study of variance from the Guidelines, which may inform a
richer understanding of judicial decision-making. This methodology may not completely account
for all forms of prosecutorial discretion. For example, sentence recommendations submitted by
prosecutors can influence the sentencing outcome. But this thesis improves on previous studies by
providing an empirical evaluation of the amount of variance from the maximum Guidelines value
and the minimum Guidelines value—accounting for the presence of mandatory minimums. This
captures important information that may be lost by merely using sentence length as the dependent
variable and controlling for the Sentencing Guidelines. It is possible that judicial ideology mediates
the variance in sentencing below the Guidelines, but has no effect on the amount of variance within
the Guidelines.
In addition to sentence length and variance from the Guidelines, this thesis also studies the
probability of certain departure categories. Because there is variance in sentence length, I also
study the probabilities of downward and upward departures relative to the probability of within
range sentences. To account for the presence of prosecutorial discretion, I use a subset that excludes
government initiated departures.
The ideology of judges will be tested using the judicial common-space scores from Bonica and
Sen (2017). These scores will be described in more detail in the Matched Data section. Following
the methodology in Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007), I use a dummy variable (circdem) to test the
partisan composition of the circuit courts. A circuit court comprised of a majority of Democrat-
appointees in the year of sentencing is coded as 1, the value of 0 is given if otherwise. Finally, I use
the political affiliation of the district judge (party of the appointing president) to model the effects
of political alignment.
34 If the Guidelines minimum is below the mandatory minimum, the statutory minimum supersedes the Guidelines min-
imum.
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4.3 Empirical Strategy
For the preliminary analysis, I implement an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with the un-
matched data set. The following dependent variables are used: sentence length, amount of departure
from the maximum range, and amount of departure from the minimum range. The following inde-
pendent variables are of interest: defendant gender, defendant age, defendant level of education,
various dummy variables for defendant race, whether the defendant had criminal history, whether
the defendant pleaded guilty, whether restitution was ordered, the number of counts, and the year
of sentencing. For the final analysis, these independent variables will serve as controls for vari-
ous defendant-level and case-level characteristics, following previous studies on sentencing (Boyd
& Nelson, 2017; Cohen & Yang, 2019; Schanzenbach & Tiller, 2007). I also run an OLS regres-
sion using a natural log transformation of sentence length to account for the skewed distribution of
sentences.
For the final analysis, two types of models are used. First, I use OLS regression to model the
effect of ideology (judicial common space scores) and other judicial characteristics (judge gender,
judge age, and judge race) on sentence length, amount of departure from the Guidelines maximum,
and amount of departure from the Guidelines minimum. The independent variables from the pre-
liminary analysis will be implemented as controls.
Then, I use a multinomial logistic regression to model the probabilities of a departure below the
Guidelines, a departure above the Guidelines, and a sentence within the Guidelines. For the logistic
regression, I test a smaller sample of cases (excluding government initiated departures). Despite
some degree of natural ordering, multinominal logistic regression is preferred to ordinal logistic re-
gression because there is a limited number of above departures in the dataset and upward departures
are generally quite rare.35 To summarize, the OLS regression models will be used to study sentence
length and the amount of departure (variance from the sentencing range). The multinomial logistic
regression model will be used to study the probability of departures.
Finally, I run OLS regressions that include an interaction term to model the effect of political
alignment in the final dataset as well as a subset that excludes government initiated departures.
Specifically, I interact the political affiliation of the district judge (party of the appointing president)
with the partisan composition of the circuit court. The main dependent variables of interest are
sentence length and amount of variance from the Guidelines.
35 However, similar results are obtained using a ordinal logistic regression.
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5 Preliminary Data
There is almost no research on descriptive features of sentencing in human trafficking cases. This
section explores how defendant characteristics affect sentence length. The purpose of this analysis
is to identify the defendant and case factors that influence the final prison sentence, as well as
the amount of variance from the Guidelines. Despite research suggesting that Black males are
disproportionally prosecuted for trafficking offenses, it is not clear how defendant gender and race
may affect sentencing (Bouche´ & Daku, 2019). And so, differences in sentence length by defendant
race and gender are worth investigating.
5.1 Charging Strategy
Prosecutors have immense leverage over the sentencing process. In the context of human trafficking,
prosecutors can exercise discretion in determining which charges to indict defendants on. But given
the absence of data on charging decisions, it is not possible to determine which charges prosecutors
rely on. It is possible to analyze which statutes defendants are ultimately convicted under. Table 1
describes the frequencies of specific statutes.
Table 1: Frequencies of Specific Statutes of Conviction
Charge Statutory Provision Defendants
Forced labor 1589 35 (3%)
Trafficking (includes labor recruitment) 1590 37 (3%)
Sex trafficking of children 1591 881 (72%)
”Knowing” or ”reckless disregard” 1591(a) 755 (61%)
Victim under 14 or force, fraud, coercion 1591(b)(1) 159 (13%)
Victim above 14 under 18 1591(b)(2) 345 (28%)
”Reasonable opportunity to observe” 1591(c) 61 (5%)
Obstruction 1591(d) 20 (2%)
Document servitude 1592 11 (1%)
General provisions 1594 573 (47%)
Attempt 1594(a) 86 (7%)
Conspiracy to violate other 1594(b) 9 (<1%)
Conspiracy to violate 1591 1594(c) 432 (35%)
Many of these categories overlap and data for specific subsections may not be complete. §1589
and §1590 are statutes pertaining to labor trafficking. 1590 is a broader statute and includes labor
recruitment and other practices. Illegal use of documents in furtherance to labor trafficking, §1592,
is a statute that often pertains cases of labor trafficking involving visa fraud. The most common
statutes of conviction are §1591 and §1594. §1591 criminalizes the sex trafficking of children. §1594
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lists general provisions against human trafficking. In practice, prosecutors rely on §1594 in cases
where there trafficking is either attempted or there is a conspiracy to engage in acts of trafficking.
These charges may reflect undercover government “sting” cases, where federal law enforcement
agents may pose as a minor. However, some convictions under §1594 do involve actual victims.
And so, the statutes of conviction do not necessarily track the substantive nature of the offense.
Several points are of note. First, §1591(a) requires the government to prove that the defendant
“knowingly” or “in reckless disregard of the fact” engaged in acts of sex trafficking or financially
benefited from it. §1591(c) creates an exception to this. In cases where “the defendant had a
reasonable opportunity to observe the person,” the government “knew, or recklessly disregarded the
fact, that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.”36 But this exception is not common; only
61 defendants were convicted of this subsection of the statute. This may indicate that prosecutors
are unwilling to charge individuals with this specific subsection or that prosecutions of trafficking
generally have enough evidence to prove that the defendant acted either knowingly or with reckless
disregard. It is also important to note that sex trafficking of a victim above the age of 14 but under
the age of 18 is more common than trafficking of a victim under the age of 14 or trafficking by
force, fraud, or coercion. Third, many defendants are convicted of a single violation of §1594(c).
Given that only §1591 includes statutory minimums, this may also be evidence of plea bargaining
decisions, where prosecutors drop §1591 charges in favor of a §1594 charge.
Table 2: Number of Counts
Number of counts Defendants
1 832 (68%)
2 173 (14%)
3 82 (7%)
4 43 (3%)
5 21 (2%)
6 23 (2%)
7 and greater 56 (5%)
Table 2 shows the number of counts that defendants are convicted on. The majority of defen-
dants are convicted of a single charge. It may be the case that many of the single count convic-
tions are defendants who were originally charged with more offenses (a practice known as “charge-
stacking”). Indeed, 806 out of 832 (97%) of the single count defendants pleaded guilty. This may
suggest that prosecutors have substantial bargaining power in the context of human trafficking.
36 18 U.S.C 18, §1591(c).
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5.2 Summary Statistics
Table 7 provides summary statistics for the USSC dataset. The average age of the defendants is
32 years old. 1,005 (81.7%) defendants were male and 225 (18.3%) defendants were female. 182
defendants were identified as White, 820 defendants were identified as Black, and 192 defendants
were Hispanic. 1036 defendants (84.2%) pleaded guilty. The average sentence length is 167 months.
In general, about 97% of federal defendants plead guilty.37 In contrast to defendants charged
with other federal offenses, defendants charged with human trafficking offenses appear less likely to
plead guilty. One reason for this may be the significant penalties imposed by mandatory minimums
for sex trafficking. Because individuals charged with sex trafficking may face minimum sentences
of 10 or 15 years, they may be greater incentives to go to trial. Figure 3 shows the distribution of
sentences by year. Data from fiscal year 2009 were not included in the visualization due to a limited
number of sentences.
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Figure 3: Density plot of sentence length by year
From the time period of 2010-2018, there do not seem to be significant changes in the overall
distribution of sentence length. Sentences are clustered around several specific x-values. These
values include mandatory minimums for sex trafficking: 120 months and 180 months. The largest
cluster is at 120 months, which is the mandatory minimum for sex trafficking of a minor above
the age of 14 years. The dataset also includes a number of life sentences coded at 470 months.
The distribution of sentences is relatively consistent from year to year. However, the distribution
of sentences is asymmetric and right-skewed. Given the skewed distribution, ordinary least-squares
(OLS) estimation may lead to biased results. In later analysis, a natural log transformation of
37 United States Sentencing Commission (2019).
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sentence length will be used as an additional dependent variable.
As I described in the methodology, alternative dependent variables will be used to measure the
amount of departure from the Guidelines maximum. Figure 4 shows the amount of difference from
the sentencing range maximum and minimum.
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Figure 4: Density plot of departures from Guidelines
The distributions of variance from the maximum and minimum are noticeably less skewed com-
pared to sentence length. In fact, Figure 4 shows that many sentences do not depart from the sen-
tencing range minimum (clustering around the value of 0). These are often instances where the
mandatory minimum is applied. The distribution of departures is also relatively consistent from
year to year.
5.3 Gender and Race on Sentence Length
Gender and racial disparities have been observed in the prosecutions of human trafficking cases
(Bouche´ & Daku, 2019; Denton, 2016). In fiscal year 2015, a majority of the defendants charged
with trafficking offenses in district court were male (Motivans & Snyder, 2018, 8). A majority of
the defendants charged were also black. This does not indicate that unwarranted disparities are
present.38 However, gender and racial disparities are well observed in the criminal justice system
(Cohen & Yang, 2019; Fischman & Schanzenbach, 2012; Mustard, 2001; Starr, 2015; United States
Sentencing Commission, 2012). For defendants, it is likely that female defendants receive shorter
38 To be precise, my use of the term “sentencing disparities” does not assume that certain sentencing differences are unfair
or unwarranted. For example, Bierschbach and Bibas (2016) provide a critique of the use of the term “disparities.”
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sentences. Judges’ knowledge about sex offenses is accordingly limited, with research showing that
some judges believe female sex offenders deserve lower sentences because they are less likely to
reoffend (Bumby & Maddox, 1999). For trafficking offenses, sentences vary depending on various
defendant characteristics, as shown by Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Defendant characteristics and sentence length
Indeed, male defendants are given longer sentences on average compared to female defendants.
Male defendants are sentenced to an average of 185.5 months compared to 94.2 months for female
defendants. This likely reflects the nature of sex trafficking. In general, the majority of victims
are female while the majority of traffickers are male. Female offenders, even when facilitating sex
trafficking, may be victimized or abused by male offenders. And often, human trafficking takes a
hierarchical nature. As the 11th Circuit explains: “[a]t the top of each pimp’s organization was his
‘bottom girl,’ a trusted and experienced prostitute or female associate.”39 The fact that “bottom girls”
are in such a position may mean that they are victimized. But they may still engage in conduct that
is in violation of sex trafficking statutes, such as recruiting victims to commercial sex. And so, when
bottom girls are prosecuted, they may receive shorter sentences compared to sentences given to the
main trafficker.40 This fact seems to be reflected by the substantial difference in sentence length.
In sex trafficking prosecutions, it is often difficult to prove elements of coercion (Rao, 2017). And
so, female defendants who are also victims may serve as valuable witnesses for the prosecution.
For these cooperating witnesses, prosecutors may initiate “substantial assistance” departures. These
motions allow sentences that are below the mandatory minimum.
39 United States v. Pipkins, 378 F.3d 1281, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 2004).
40 Levy (2016) discusses bottom girls in more detail.
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There are also differences in sentencing based on race. On average, black defendants are sen-
tenced to 181.2 months while white defendants are sentenced to 142.1 months. Hispanic defendants
are sentenced to 154.3 months. These sentencing differences do not necessarily indicate that there
are unwarranted sentencing disparities. For example, other factors like criminal history may ac-
count for differences in criminal sentencing. The following box plots present these differences. In
the next section, I control for various factors that may affect the final sentence to determine whether
there are additional race-based or gender-based differences.
5.4 Preliminary Results
In order to study sentencing differences while controlling for various defendant and case-level fac-
tors, OLS regression is used. First, OLS results are presented for three dependent variables: (1)
total sentence length, (2) departure from the final Guidelines maximum calculation, and (3) depar-
ture from the final Guidelines minimum calculation. Total sentence length is capped at 470 months,
which is how the United States Sentencing Commission treats life sentences. The values of (2) are
calculated by taking the difference between maximum Guidelines determination and (1). The values
of (3) are calculated by taking the difference between (1) and the minimum Guidelines determina-
tion, which is trumped by the mandatory minimum sentence in applicable circumstances. All three
of the variables are conceptualized in months, which allows for any effects to be easily interpreted.
Table 12 presents the OLS results. Several interesting findings are worth discussing. As seen
in previous studies, plea bargains are shown to have a substantial effect on overall sentence length.
Defendants who pleaded guilty are given sentences that are 132 months less than defendants who
did not plead guilty (Table 12, Model 1). This result is significant at the 1% level. However, the
effect of a guilty plea is much smaller and less significant when the dependent variable is the amount
of departure from the Guidelines minimum and maximum (Model 2 and Model 3). This shows that
the effect of guilty pleas is well captured within the Guidelines. Defendants who pleaded guilty may
ultimately be convicted on lesser offenses, which then lead to lower guideline ranges.
Gender is also shown to have a substantial effect. Results show that female defendants receive
shorter sentences, with overall sentences that average 67 months less than sentences for males. This
is consistent with the existing literature on female offenders, such as Rodriguez et al. (2006) which
show that female defendants are given preferential treatment. But the size of the gender difference is
unique to trafficking cases. This is consistent with the previous discussion that female defendants,
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particularly “bottom girls,” may themselves be victims. These female defendants may cooperate
with law enforcement and serve as witnesses for the prosecution. What is interesting, however, is
that the effects of gender are not entirely captured within the Guidelines themselves. For female
defendants, judges depart on average 34 months from the minimum guideline calculation (Table 12,
Model 3). This effect is highly significant and indicates that judges are more lenient—and may use
their discretion—when sentencing female defendants. Race also has a significant effect on overall
sentence length, but only for African Americans. This finding is consistent with previous studies on
sentencing (Ulmer, 2018).
In Table 13, I check model results using a natural log transformation of sentence length. One
limitation, however, of using log of sentence length as the dependent variable is that the results are
not easily interpreted. However, this model accounts for skew in sentence length, as previously
shown in Figure 3. Plea bargain and gender, which both have negative coefficients, are also highly
significant in this model. Race is also significant in this model, and African Americans are shown
to receive longer sentences on average.
6 Matched Data
6.1 Summary Statistics
The matched dataset is not substantially different from the preliminary dataset. Table 9 provides
summary statistics for the matched dataset. The average age of the defendants is 31 years old, com-
pared to 32 years old in the unmatched dataset. In the matched dataset, 689 (82.6%) defendants were
male and 136 (17.4%) defendants were female. 122 defendants were identified as White, 566 defen-
dants were identified as Black, and 129 defendants were Hispanic. 713 defendants (85.5%) pleaded
guilty. The average sentence length in the matched dataset is 169 months. Summary statistics for
the various departure categories are presented below.
Table 3: Number of Departures
Type of Departure Defendants
Above range 27 (3%)
Within range 280 (34%)
Below range 202 (24%)
Government sponsored 156 (19%)
Substantial assistance (5K1.1) 169 (20%)
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As observed in other studies, above range sentences are rare.41 Within range studies are the
most common. Three kinds of below departures are listed. Below range refers to judge initiated
departures. Both government sponsored and substantial assistance refer to government initiated de-
partures. Departures also vary depending on defendant gender. Table 4, presents summary statistics
for the various departure categories for female defendants. Compared to Table 3, there is a greater
proportion of substantial assistance departures for female defendants.
Table 4: Number of Departures for Female Defendants
Type of Departure Defendants
Above range 2 (2%)
Within range 24 (18%)
Below range 32 (24%)
Government sponsored 26 (19%)
Substantial assistance (5K1.1) 52 (38%)
This may partially explain why female defendants receive lower sentences compared to male
defendants. Female defendants who receive substantial assistance motions may have cooperated and
served as witnesses for the prosecution. When defendants receive substantial assistance departures
or other government sponsored departures, it is likely that judicial discretion is limited in relation to
prosecutorial discretion.
To study the effect of sentencing across different kinds of human trafficking, defendants were
coded into the following non-overlapping categories. The three categories are forced labor, sex
trafficking, and conspiracy (to violate §1591). Table 5 shows that the majority of the cases involve
sex trafficking. There are only a few forced labor cases in the sample. This makes it difficult to
compare differences between sex trafficking sentencing and labor trafficking sentencing.
Table 5: Summary of Case Type
Type of Case Defendants
Forced labor 37 (5%)
Sex trafficking 613 (75%)
Conspiracy 172 (21%)
These categories do not necessarily reflect the substantive nature of the case. Instead, these
categories are based on the statutes of conviction. For example, some defendants engage in actual
sex trafficking but may only be convicted of a single conspiracy charge. Other defendants may
engage in both sex and labor trafficking, but may be charged only under labor trafficking statutes.
41 Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007).
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Cases are categorized to account for differences in sentencing. The sex trafficking category includes
§1591 cases, which have mandatory minimum penalties. The forced labor category includes §1589,
§1590, and §1592 cases. The conspiracy category includes only §1594(c) cases that do not involve
any other statute. Defendants with convictions under certain provisions of §1594 provisions and
convictions under §1591 are coded as sex trafficking.
Departures also varied depending on the case type. Statistics are presented for the proportion of
each departure category within a specific case type. For example, 36% of the sentences in the sex
trafficking category were within the sentencing range.
Table 6: Number of Departures by Case Type
Type of Departure Sex Labor Conspiracy
Above range 17 (3%) 7 (18%) 3 (2%)
Within range 222 (36%) 16 (42%) 42 (24%)
Below range 146 (24%) 8 (21%) 48 (27%)
Government sponsored 105 (17%) 7 (18%) 44 (25%)
Substantial assistance (51K.1) 130 (21%) 0 (0%) 39 (22%)
For all three case categories, most cases are either within the sentencing range or below the
sentencing range. The proportion of within range sentences is slightly higher for the sex trafficking
category than for the conspiracy category. Overall, there are not large differences in the proportion
of certain departures across the categories. Within range sentences are slightly higher in the sex
trafficking sample compared to the conspiracy sample, which may indicate mandatory minimums.
6.2 Judges
In Table 11, descriptive statistics for judges are provided. In the matched dataset, 211 (25%) judges
were female. 674 judges were identified as White, 76 judges were identified as Black, and 64
judges were identified as Hispanic. There are about equal numbers of defendants sentenced by
Democrat-appointed judges as there are Republican-appointed judges with 51% Democratic and
49% Republican. At the circuit court level, 528 (63%) defendants were sentenced in a district where
the supervising circuit court consisted of majority Democrat-appointees in the year of sentencing.
Judicial ideology scores are from Bonica and Sen (2017). Ideology is computed using the “Ju-
dicial Common Space” methodology first developed by Epstein, Martin, Segal, and Westerland
(2007).42 Rather than using legislative vote records, Bonica and Sen use data on political contri-
42 Epstein et al. (2007) builds upon the influential common space measures developed by Keith T. Poole and Howard
Rosenthal (Poole, 1998; Poole & Rosenthal, 1985, 1991).
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butions from the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections to estimate ideology for
political actors. In short, this method involves estimating ideal points for political actors by using
patterns in campaign contribution behavior. Contributors are assumed to donate to ideologically
proximate candidates. And so, it is possible to estimate where political actors fall ideologically
based on the behavior of contributors Bonica (2014). District judge ideology is estimated using
the average ideology score of the two appointing Senators. Later, I compare the robustness of my
main results to alternative measures of judicial ideology. The average score for judges appointed
by Democratic presidents is -0.72 and the average score for judges appointed by Republican pres-
idents is 0.79. The main advantage of using a continuous measurement of judicial ideology is that
it is possible to determine the relationship between ideology and decision-making within judges
appointed by presidents from the same party. Previous studies on sentencing have largely used the
party of the appointing president as a proxy for ideology. However, this fails to distinguish between
ideological differences within party. A density distribution showing the ideology of the judges in
the final dataset is shown below. More liberal judges are given lower values and more conservative
judges are given higher values.
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Figure 6: Density plot of judge ideology
Another related advantage of using ideology scores is that some Democrat-appointed judges
may be more ideologically conservative than some Republican-appointed judges. As Figure 6
shows, there are significant ideological differences between judges appointed by presidents from
the same party. For Republican-appointed judges, there is greater clustering in the distribution of
ideology scores. In contrast, the distribution is flatter for Democrat-appointees. On the whole, this
suggests that Republican-appointed judges are more ideologically unified.
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7 Results
This section presents results for OLS regressions using the matched dataset. I use a variety of OLS
regression models to study sentence length. I also implement a multinomial logistic regression
to study the probability of departure. Finally, I describe results for OLS regressions that include
political alignment as an interaction term.
7.1 OLS Regression
To begin, it is helpful to consider sentence length between different types of cases (sex trafficking,
conspiracy, and labor). Table 14 presents OLS regression results for sentence length by the three
case types. First, it is observed the defendant gender only has effects for sex trafficking cases.
This is consistent with the previous explanation as to why female defendants may be given shorter
sentences. In this analysis, judicial ideology is also observed to be significant only in the sample
of sex trafficking cases. In general, when sentences are severe and there are mandatory minimum
penalties, it is thought that judicial discretion and the effect of ideology are limited. And so, this
finding is interesting because sex trafficking defendants are given the highest sentences.
As Figure 7 shows, conspiracy sentences tend to be lower than most sex trafficking sentences.
Only sex trafficking convictions carry mandatory minimum penalties. Given these reasons, it is
unclear why judicial ideology is not more significant in the sample of conspiracy cases. Labor cases
are included in the analysis of case types. However, the results may not be very informative due to
the limited number of defendants convicted under forced labor charges.
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Figure 7: Sentence length by substantive offense type
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According to Figure 7, the effect of judicial ideology seems to be flat in the sample of conspiracy
defendants. For sex trafficking and labor defendants, higher scores (more conservative judges) result
in higher sentences. Table 14, which controls for various case and defendant characteristics, finds
that a one unit increase in the ideology score is correlated with an increase of about 11 months in
the total sentence for sex trafficking offenses.
When including the full sample of cases, Table 15 shows that judicial ideology has a signifi-
cant effect on overall sentence length. The effect of judicial ideology increases when government
initiated departures are excluded, as shown by Table 16. But when a log transformation is taken of
the dependent variable, judicial ideology fails to remain significant. The effect of judicial ideology
is not significant across a range of alternative measures of ideology (Table 18). In addition, Table
15 shows that judicial ideology does not have a significant effect on the amount of departure from
the sentencing maximum or the amount of departure from the sentencing minimum. In sum, these
findings show that the overall effect of ideology is not very strong and may be limited to the final
sentence length.
Interestingly, the effect of ideology on sentence length is much greater for judges appointed by
Democrat presidents compared to judges appointed by Republican presidents. This finding is not
captured by merely looking at the party affiliation of the appointing president. Given ideological
differences between judges appointed by presidents from the same party, it is useful to analyze
a sample of Democrat-appointed judges and a sample of Republican-appointed judges. Figure 8
plots the log of sentence length by the judicial common space scores. The party affiliation of the
appointing president for the district judge is shown in color.
3
4
5
6
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
JCS CFscore
Lo
g 
of
 S
en
te
nc
e 
Le
ng
th
Democratic
Republican
Sentence Length by Party Affliation
Figure 8: Sentence length by party of appointing president
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It is important to note that the models in Table 19 use different samples of defendants. And so,
it is not entirely helpful to compare between the sample of Democrat-appointees and the sample
of Republican-appointees. In particular, the model coefficients are not easily comparable. But it is
possible to observe whether the effect of ideology is statistically significant. In a sample of judges
appointed by Republican presidents, ideology is not shown to have a statistically significant effect
on sentence length (Model 2 in Table 19). But ideology is shown to have a statistically significant
effect on sentence length for judges appointed by Democrat presidents (Model 1 in Table 19). In
other words, judicial ideology affects the total sentence length, but only for judges appointed by
presidents from the Democratic party. According to Table 19, a one point increase in the ideology
score (judges in the Democrat-only sample range from -1.271 to -0.161) has the effect of a 34
month increase in total sentence length in the sample of Democrat-appointed judges. This is a
highly significant finding, as the p value is less than 0.01. As Table 21 shows, this finding is also
significant using an alternative measure of judicial ideology—JCS scores based on the legislative
record of appointing Senators. Finally, this finding is highly significant when the log of sentence
length is used as the dependent variable (Table 20).
In the Democrat-appointed judge sample, judicial ideology does not appear to have a signifi-
cant effects on the amount of departure from the Guidelines (Table 22 and Table 23). For judges
appointed by Democratic presidents, ideology affects the total sentence, but not the amount of de-
parture from the Guidelines. This may be evidence that ideology has an influence on certain fact and
law based adjustments. In short, ideology may have an effect on the determination of the sentencing
range. But once the sentencing range is established, ideology may not have any additional effects.
In Table 15, the coefficients for judge gender are small but positive, indicting that female judges
give slightly longer sentences. However, judge gender is not statistically significant in this model.
Table 19 and Table 20 provide interesting results about the effects of judge gender. Notably, judge
gender has a positive coefficient in the sample of Democrat-appointed judges and a negative coef-
ficient in the sample of Republican appointed judges. In other words, female Democrat-appointed
judges give longer sentences (by about 16.5 months) relative to male Democrat-appointed judges.
But female Republican-appointed judges give shorter sentences (by about 23.3 months) relative to
male Republican-appointed judges. In Table 19, judge gender is statistically significant at the 10%
level for both models. But the effect of judge gender is stronger in the sample of Republican-
appointed judges, as shown by the coefficients in Table 20.
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7.2 Multinomial Logistic Regression
Table 24 and Table 25 present the results of the multinomial logistic regression model. This model
excludes government initiated departures. Above range departures are included, but there are a
limited number of sentences that are above the Guidelines range.
Table 24 presents the coefficients for the multinominal logistic regression model. Because the
coefficients in this model output are difficult to understand, an odds ratio is used to interpret the
model coefficients. Table 25 provides these results. On average, judges are 2.1 times as likely to
depart downwards (compared to a sentence that is within the Guidelines) when the majority of the
circuit court judges are appointed by Democratic presidents (Table 25). This result is statistically
significant at the the 1% level (the p value is less than 0.01). However, judicial ideology, measured
by common space scores, is not statistically significant. This is consistent with the OLS results
discussed previously. Overall, judicial ideology does not seem to have a large effect on sentences—
including sentence length as well as the probability of departure from the Guidelines.
The predicted probabilities for each departure category are presented in Figure 9. Within, for ex-
ample, refers to sentences within the Guidelines. A dotted line indicates the predicted probabilities
when the circuit court is made up of a majority of Democratic-appointees in the year of sentencing.
Finally, the JCS CFscores measure judicial ideology, with negative values indicating more liberal
judges and positive values indicating more conservative judges.
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Figure 9 shows that the most conservative judges are only a few percentage points less likely to
issue downward departures than the most liberal judges. Ideology, measured by judicial common
space scores, has a small effect on the probabilities in each category. The partisan composition of
the circuit court, rather than an individual judge’s ideology, has a greater effect on the probabil-
ity of certain departures. To interpret the coefficients of Table 24, a first difference analysis was
performed. Figure 10 shows the effect in terms of probabilities when the Circuit court is majority
Democrat-appointees in the year of sentencing. This provides a coefficient that can be interpreted
in terms of the probability of a particular departure category. When the circuit court is made up
of a majority of judges appointed by Democratic presidents, the probability of a sentence within
the Guidelines is 16.4 percent lower. The probability of a sentence below the Guidelines is 14.9
percentage points higher. The effect on above departures is small or nonexistent.
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The first difference analysis shows that the probability of within range sentences roughly trades
off with the probability of below departures. Consistent with previous studies, above departures are
not commonly used as an alternative option. This is consistent with the assumption that departures
are subject to stricter appellate review. And so, individual judge ideology may be constrained by
other factors, such as the desire to avoid reversals.
Finally, judge gender does appear to have an interesting effect on the probability of departure.
According to Table 25, female judges are 1.5 times as likely to depart downwards. Judge gender is
statistically significant at the 10% level but not the 5% level.
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7.3 OLS Regression with Interaction Terms
This section discusses results for OLS regressions that include political alignment as an interaction
term. What is especially interesting is that circuit court composition has effects for both Democratic
as well as Republican district judges. The impact of this can be quantified in terms of sentence
length. As the results of Table 26 show, when there is a majority Democratic circuit court, the
average total sentence is reduced. When there is a Democratic district judge, the average total
sentence is also lower. However, the partisan composition of the circuit court has a larger impact on
sentence length than the individual partisan affiliation of the district judge.
To interpret the effect of political alignment, we can take the sum total of the two coefficients
and the interaction term (Dem, Dem Circuit, and Dem x Dem Circuit). When a Democrat-appointed
district judge is in a majority Democrat-appointed circuit, the average sentence is 26.8 months
lower. Compare this to the coefficient of Dem, which shows that the average sentence for non-
aligned Democrat-appointed judges is 22.1 months lower. In other words, political alignment for
Democrat-appointed district judges decreases sentences by about 4.7 months. Given this fact, circuit
alignment does not seem to have a very large effect for Democrat-appointed judges. In contrast,
when Republican district judges are aligned with the circuit court, the effect of political alignment
is much greater—sentences are increased by 27.9 months. The effect of partisan alignment with the
circuit court (by the interaction term Dem x Dem Circuit) was statistically significant at the 10%
level but not statistically significant at the 5% level (p value = 0.09193).
When government initiated departures are excluded, the effects of political ideology and circuit
court composition are much greater. This is consistent with the hydraulic theory of judging, which
predicts that increases in prosecutorial discretion reduce judicial discretion. But consistent with the
findings in the full sample, political alignment has larger effects for Republican-appointed judges.
In contrast, political alignment has little to no effect for Democrat-appointed judges in this sample.
The results of Table 27 find that when a Democrat-appointed district judge is politically aligned with
the circuit court, the average sentence is 40.6 months lower. When a Democrat-appointed district
judge is not politically aligned, the average sentence is 41.4 months lower. Thus, there is not a large
effect from political alignment. For Republican-appointed judges, sentences are 35.7 months lower
when the circuit court is majority Democrat-appointees (conversely, 35.7 months higher when the
circuit court is majority Republican-appointees). Both the effects of political ideology and circuit
court composition are a considerable discount, given that the average sentence is 202 months when
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government initiated departures are excluded. Additionally, the interaction term is more significant
in this sample of defendants. In Model 1 of Table 27, the interaction term is just outside the 5%
level, with a p value of 0.0677.
Figure 11 plots the interactive coefficients in Table 26 (full sample) and Table 27 (excluding
government departures). This figure provides a clearer illustration of the results above. On the x-
axis, a value of 0 indicates that there is a Republican-appointed district judge. A value of 1 indicates
that there is a Democrat-appointed district judge. The partisan composition of the circuit court is
presented by different colors.
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Figure 11: Interaction effects of political alignment
When there is a Democrat-appointed district judge, political alignment (shown in the blue)
has little to no effect on sentence length. When there is a Republican-appointed district judge,
political alignment has a much greater effect on sentence length. When the circuit court is majority
Republican-appointees, Republican district judges tend to give longer sentences (shown in red).
Thus, political alignment matters more for Republican-appointed district judges than Democrat-
appointed district judges.
Models 2 and 3 from Table 26 and Table 27, which examine the amount of departure from
the Guidelines maximum and minimum, are also worth discussing. Only judge age is statistically
significant in these models. The coefficient is negative and the effect is almost twice as large in
the sample that excludes government initiated departures. Most studies on sentencing have not paid
attention to judge age—it is possible that human trafficking, a relatively newer offense, may be
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viewed differently by younger judges. This may also be due to the fact that younger judges who are
appointed post-Booker are less anchored to the Sentencing Guidelines (Yang, 2014).
Notably, judge gender does not seem to have a statistically significant effect on sentence length
in Table 26 and Table 27. The coefficient of judge gender is positive, showing that female judges
give longer sentences. On the other hand, the results from the multinominal logistic regression
indicate that female judges are more likely to depart below the Sentencing Guidelines. The overall
findings on judge gender are mixed, and suggest that the relationship between gender and sentencing
for trafficking offenses is complex. For example, it is possible that female judges—compared to
male judges—are more likely to issue departures but also sentence defendants that are within or
above the Guidelines more harshly.
8 Discussion
Human trafficking cases are not like typical “street crimes.” Accordingly, sentencing for human traf-
ficking offenses does not proceed like sentencing for street crimes (Schanzenbach & Tiller, 2007).
First, the findings in this thesis show that there are important gender dynamics in trafficking cases.
As I have shown in the preliminary analysis, female defendants are given substantially lower sen-
tences even when controlling for a variety of case based factors. And female judges seem to respond
differently depending on political affiliation. Second, many trafficking cases involve complex fac-
tors that relate to other criminal offenses. For example, some cases may also involve drug traffick-
ing. In multiple cases, drugs were used as one of the methods of coercion.43 This makes studying
ideology difficult since there may be substantive differences that are not related to the human traf-
ficking aspect. For example, judges may respond differently to human trafficking cases that also
involve drugs as a method of coercion. And like other sex offenses, some defendants convicted of
human trafficking offenses resemble white collar criminals. These dimensions may partially explain
why the effect of ideology is not unified across the political spectrum.
Hypothesis 1A is partially supported. Ideology, measured by judicial common space scores, has
a statistically significant effect, but only for Democrat-appointed judges. More liberal judges do give
shorter sentences relative to more conservative judges, but the relationship between ideology and
sentence length is not linear. Several possible explanations are worth considering. First, it may be
43 United States v. Blake, No. 9:13-cr-80054 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2013); United States v. Washington, No. 3:16-cr-00131
(E.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2017).
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that sentences are already very severe. And so, sentences may reach a point (a peak, so to speak) in
which ideology no longer seems to have an influence. For an offense where the sentences are lower
on average, ideology may have a more linear effect. Alternatively, it may be the case that Democrat-
appointed judges are less unified in their approaches to sentencing. As the judicial common space
scores indicate, there is greater ideological uniformity for Republican-appointed judges. More gen-
erally, Democrat-appointed judges may differ depending on the nature of the criminal activity, such
as whether the defendant resembles a white collar criminal.44 This explanation may be supported
by previous studies like Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007), finding that Democrat-appointed judges
may sentence more harshly than Republican-appointed judges for white collar crimes.
The findings on ideology are consistent with the predictions of the instrument choice theory of
judicial sentencing. Ideology has an impact on the overall sentence length, but not on amount of
variance from the Guidelines. This shows the effect of ideology is not solely captured by variation
within the Guidelines range—for example, if Democrat-appointed judges usually give sentences on
the lower end of the sentencing range and Republican-appointed judges usually give sentences on
the higher end of the sentencing range. The findings on ideology suggest that some judges may
be using adjustments and other fact-based tools to advance their sentencing preferences. There is,
however, a question about whether the observed differences are related to genuine preferences that
judges may have. It is hard to determine what judges are really thinking when they make sentencing
decisions. It may be the case that Democrat-appointed judges simply approach certain sentencing
questions differently. But this, I think, gets at a broader question of whether the assumptions of
the model of judges as strategic decision-makers are accurate. The findings from this thesis merely
support the predictions of a theory of sentencing that models judges as strategic policy-maximizers.
But that is not say that the theory itself is accurate.
For Hypothesis 1B, the results show that judge gender is not statistically significant at the 5%
level. Overall, judge gender has little to no effect on sentencing. However, the interesting and sur-
prising finding is that the effect of judge gender seems to differ depending on the political affiliation
of the appointing president. That is, gender has effects for Republican-appointed judges that are
in a different direction than effects for Democrat-appointed judges. This indicates that there may
be interesting interactions between gender and ideology. However, it is difficult to study this given
the limited number of female judges in the sample. Another interesting question is how female
44 For example, United States v. Epstein, 19 CR. 490 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 18, 2019). I use the term “white collar” to
refer to defendants who are, on average, wealthier and more educated.
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judges sentence female defendants. But this is also difficult to study given the limitations of the
final dataset.
Hypothesis 2 is not supported since judicial ideology has little to no effect in the multinomial
regression model. However, the partisan composition of the circuit court was found to have a large
effect on the likelihood of judicial departures below the range determined by the Sentencing Guide-
lines. Circuit court composition influences the choice of instrument, that is, the probability of below
departures. This finding confirms the positive political theory of criminal sentencing that models
judges as strategic actors within an existing hierarchy. If anything, these results show that parti-
san composition of the circuit court may matter more than the political affiliation of the individual
judge. It is unclear whether this effect is unique to human trafficking cases. In general, these results
strongly support a sentencing theory that models judges as acting within an existing hierarchy.
Hypothesis 3 is partially supported. Political alignment seems to have larger effects for Republican-
appointed judges. Consistent with 3B, sentences are higher when Republicans are politically aligned
with the circuit court. When Democrats are aligned, there is not a large effect on sentence length,
showing that 3A is not supported. As shown by Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007), “alignment matters,
and matters differently, for Republican and Democrat judges.” It is unclear, however, why alignment
seems to matter more for Republican-appointed judges. But this finding does seem to support the
instrument choice theory. Democrat-appointed judges may be inclined to use various instruments to
advance their sentencing goals—when the circuit court is majority Democrat-appointees, Democrat-
appointed district judges choose to depart (shown by the multinominal logistic regression model).
But when the circuit court is majority Republican-appointees, Democrat-appointed district judges
use adjustments to advance their sentencing preferences.
The findings of this thesis show that the effect of ideology between judges appointed by presi-
dents from the same party is worth further investigation. It has already been observed there there are
sentencing differences between Republican-appointed judges and Democrat-appointed judges. But
there has not been much analysis of the differences in judging between more liberal and more con-
servative judges appointed by presidents from the same party. Furthermore, these findings strongly
suggest that sentencing scholarship should include a focus on the ideological features of appellate
courts. Circuit court ideology can also be measured using judicial common space scores, which al-
lows for more fine-grained analyses of the relationship between circuit courts ideology and district
court sentencing.
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Table 7: Preliminary Summary Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Gender 1,230 0.2 0.4 0 0 0 1
Age 1,230 31.8 9.8 18 25 36 79
Citizenship 1,227 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
White 1,224 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Hispanic 1,224 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Black 1,224 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Crim Hist 1,228 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Counts 1,230 2.1 3.5 1 1 2 89
Plea 1,230 0.8 0.4 0 1 1 1
Sentence 1,230 167.9 116.4 0 84 216 470
Restitution 1,142 42,649.0 240,738.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 3,949,141.0
Table 8: Preliminary Variable Counts
Female White Hispanic Black Crim Hist Plea Restitution
0 = no 1,005 1,042 1,032 404 105 194 869
1 = yes 225 182 192 820 1,123 1,036 360
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Table 9: Summary Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Gender 834 0.2 0.4 0 0 0 1
Age 834 31.4 9.5 18 25 35 79
Citizen 833 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
White 830 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Hispanic 830 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Black 830 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Crim Hist 833 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Counts 834 2.0 3.7 1 1 2 89
Plea 834 0.9 0.4 0 1 1 1
Sentence 834 169.2 113.1 0 87 214.2 470
Restitution 782 30,464.6 190,044.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 3,790,339.0
Table 10: Defendant Variable Counts
Female White Hispanic Black Crim Hist Plea Restitution
0 = no 698 708 701 264 61 121 620
1 = yes 136 122 129 566 772 713 213
Table 11: Judge Variable Counts
Female White Hispanic Black Democrat Circuit Dem
0 = no 623 160 770 758 425 306
1 = yes 211 674 64 76 409 528
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Table 12: Sentence Length and Departures with Preliminary Data
Dependent variable:
Sentence Length Departure from Max Departure from Min
(1) (2) (3)
Gender (1 = female) −67.202∗∗∗ −29.480∗∗∗ −34.489∗∗∗
(7.029) (6.489) (5.870)
Age 1.156∗∗∗ 0.220 0.313
(0.293) (0.270) (0.244)
Education −3.779∗∗ 0.024 −0.234
(1.725) (1.593) (1.441)
Hispanic (1 = yes) 11.741 1.239 5.766
(9.562) (8.827) (7.985)
Black (1 = yes) 23.273∗∗∗ −15.221∗∗ −9.590
(7.653) (7.065) (6.391)
Crim Hist (1 = yes) 30.291∗∗∗ −40.632∗∗∗ −27.770∗∗∗
(10.001) (9.232) (8.351)
Plea (1 = yes) −132.110∗∗∗ −13.025∗ −15.070∗∗
(8.013) (7.398) (6.692)
Restitution (1 = yes) 30.363∗∗∗ −10.086∗ −6.678
(5.959) (5.501) (4.976)
Counts 3.420∗∗∗ −0.778 −1.088
(0.827) (0.764) (0.691)
Year 2.246∗∗ −4.266∗∗∗ −3.472∗∗∗
(1.088) (1.006) (0.910)
Constant −4,321.990∗∗ 8,565.096∗∗∗ 6,989.426∗∗∗
(2,191.268) (2,024.638) (1,831.559)
Observations 1,210 1,209 1,209
R2 0.374 0.064 0.064
Adjusted R2 0.368 0.055 0.055
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: OLS results where the dependent variables are (1) sentence length, (2) departure from the final guidelines maximum
calculation, and (3) departure from the final guidelines minimum calculation. The dependent variables are conceptualized
in months.
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Table 13: Log of Sentence Length with Preliminary Data
Dependent variable:
Log of Sentence Length
Gender −0.789∗∗∗
(0.066)
Age 0.009∗∗∗
(0.003)
Education −0.021
(0.016)
Hispanic 0.149∗
(0.089)
Black 0.243∗∗∗
(0.071)
Crim Hist 0.214∗∗
(0.094)
Plea −0.727∗∗∗
(0.074)
Restitution 0.177∗∗∗
(0.055)
Counts 0.014∗
(0.008)
Year 0.014
(0.010)
Constant −24.197
(20.336)
Observations 1,197
R2 0.264
Adjusted R2 0.257
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Given the skewed distribution of sentences, this table shows OLS results with natural log transformation of sentence
length. This table checks the robustness of the results of 12. Nonincarcerative sentences were dropped, resulting in 13
fewer observations compared to the OLS model using total sentence length as the dependent variable.
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Table 14: Sentence Length by Case Type
Model:
Conspiracy Sex Labor
(1) (2) (3)
Gender (1 = female) −18.602∗ −75.851∗∗∗ 23.467
(10.971) (11.306) (54.335)
Age 0.910 0.877∗∗ 1.569
(0.654) (0.425) (1.041)
Education −1.655 −2.123 −6.978
(3.309) (2.390) (8.449)
Hispanic (1 = yes) −2.511 −6.969 −8.776
(17.758) (14.140) (37.576)
Black (1 = yes) 1.739 1.759 45.859∗
(14.872) (11.270) (25.762)
Crim Hist (1 = yes) −10.084 27.425∗ −5.273
(17.957) (15.775) (35.909)
Plea (1 = yes) −48.790 −75.321∗∗∗ 36.564
(71.441) (10.721) (63.652)
Restitution (1 = yes) 3.408 39.657∗∗∗ −19.090
(12.887) (8.587) (27.204)
Counts 5.647 14.006∗∗∗ 1.924
(24.703) (1.678) (1.169)
Year 5.756∗∗ 1.797 −7.885∗
(2.573) (1.688) (4.592)
Ideology (JCS CFscore) 8.554 11.430∗∗ −8.876
(6.538) (4.683) (16.904)
Judge Age −0.287 −0.377 −3.700∗∗
(0.610) (0.440) (1.571)
Judge Gender −1.176 8.132 −99.604∗∗
(11.508) (8.926) (42.418)
Constant −11,444.790∗∗ −3,422.300 16,119.180∗
(5,175.147) (3,395.742) (9,241.423)
Observations 172 613 37
R2 0.090 0.383 0.511
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.369 0.234
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: OLS results where the dependent variable is sentence length. Model 1 includes conspiracy offenses, Model 2
includes sex trafficking offenses, and Model 3 includes labor trafficking offenses.
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Table 15: Sentence Length and Amount of Departure
Dependent variable:
Sentence Length Departure from Max Departure from Min
(1) (2) (3)
Ideology (JCS CFscore) 9.071∗∗ 0.037 2.033
(4.322) (3.807) (3.399)
Judge Age −0.097 −0.745∗∗ −0.854∗∗∗
(0.416) (0.366) (0.327)
Judge Gender 3.562 1.462 1.186
(7.843) (6.936) (6.194)
Judge Hispanic 8.519 −24.129∗∗ −20.730∗∗
(12.887) (11.331) (10.119)
Judge Black 11.758 −3.382 −3.820
(11.657) (10.247) (9.150)
Constant −6,120.473∗∗ 4,123.014 2,620.006
(3,045.359) (2,681.420) (2,394.519)
Observations 822 818 818
R2 0.316 0.053 0.061
Adjusted R2 0.303 0.035 0.044
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: OLS results of the final dataset where the dependent variables are (1) sentence length, (2) departure from the
final guidelines maximum calculation, and (3) departure from the final guidelines minimum calculation. The dependent
variables are conceptualized in months. Not reported: defendant characteristics (gender, age, education, race), criminal
history, case disposition, order of restitution, number of counts, and sentencing year.
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Table 16: Excluding Government Initiated Departures
Dependent variable:
Sentence Length Departure from Max Departure from Min
(1) (2) (3)
Ideology (JCS CFscore) 15.120∗∗ 2.901 4.333
(6.498) (4.647) (4.129)
Judge Age −0.178 −1.316∗∗∗ −1.428∗∗∗
(0.583) (0.416) (0.370)
Judge Gender 10.666 −7.129 −7.162
(11.353) (8.175) (7.263)
Judge Hispanic 22.125 1.904 9.463
(20.045) (14.295) (12.700)
Judge Black 9.303 −13.358 −14.852
(15.924) (11.354) (10.087)
Constant −8,477.094∗ 10.397 −1,111.045
(4,341.418) (3,104.383) (2,757.974)
Observations 499 495 495
R2 0.274 0.099 0.096
Adjusted R2 0.251 0.071 0.068
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: OLS results of the final dataset where the dependent variables are (1) sentence length, (2) departure from the
final guidelines maximum calculation, and (3) departure from the final guidelines minimum calculation. The dependent
variables are conceptualized in months. Not reported: defendant characteristics, criminal history, case disposition, order
of restitution, number of counts, and sentencing year.
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Table 17: Log of Sentence Length
Dependent variable:
Log of Sentence Length
Ideology (JCS CFscore) 0.042
(0.028)
Judge Age 0.001
(0.003)
Judge Gender −0.020
(0.051)
Judge Hispanic 0.098
(0.084)
Judge Black 0.185∗∗
(0.077)
Constant −42.627∗∗
(19.966)
Observations 818
R2 0.290
Adjusted R2 0.276
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: OLS results using natural log transformation of sentence length. This table checks the robustness of the results
of Table 15. Not reported: defendant characteristics, criminal history, case disposition, order of restitution, number of
counts, and sentencing year.
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Table 18: Robustness to Alternative Measures of Ideology
Model:
(1) (2) (3)
JCS DW-Nominate 6.587
(8.207)
President DW-Nominate 5.780
(6.271)
President CFscore 5.673
(3.902)
Judge Age 0.051 0.039 −0.058
(0.410) (0.411) (0.426)
Judge Gender 2.267 2.689 2.900
(7.862) (7.910) (7.856)
Judge Hispanic 11.986 11.610 10.236
(12.873) (12.892) (12.913)
Judge Black 10.938 11.164 11.569
(11.677) (11.681) (11.677)
Constant −5,457.776∗ −5,449.433∗ −5,830.951∗
(3,033.430) (3,031.190) (3,047.074)
Observations 822 822 821
R2 0.313 0.313 0.314
Adjusted R2 0.300 0.300 0.302
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: OLS results when dependent variable is sentence length. This table checks the robustness of the results of Table 15
using alternative measures of judicial ideology. Not reported: defendant characteristics, criminal history, case disposition,
order of restitution, number of counts, and sentencing year.
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Table 19: Sentence Length by Party Affiliation
Model:
Democrat Republican
(1) (2)
Ideology (JCS CFscore) 33.954∗∗∗ 31.978
(12.748) (21.388)
Judge Age −0.241 −0.309
(0.518) (0.643)
Judge Gender 16.458∗ −23.253∗
(8.968) (13.506)
Constant −5,961.712 −6,527.614
(4,199.031) (4,286.522)
Observations 406 416
R2 0.397 0.344
Adjusted R2 0.377 0.322
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: OLS results where the defendant variable is sentence length in months. Model 1 includes sentencing decisions by
Democrat appointed judges. Model 2 includes sentencing decisions by Republican appointed judges. Dummy variables of
judge race were excluded due to limited data. Not reported: defendant characteristics, criminal history, case disposition,
order of restitution, number of counts, and sentencing year.
Table 20: Log of Sentence Length by Party Affiliation
Model:
Democrat Republican
(1) (2)
Ideology (JCS CFscore) 0.234∗∗∗ 0.096
(0.089) (0.137)
Judge Age −0.001 −0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Judge Gender 0.076 −0.222∗∗
(0.063) (0.086)
Constant −30.827 −64.841∗∗
(29.401) (27.294)
Observations 405 413
R2 0.336 0.317
Adjusted R2 0.314 0.295
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: OLS results using natural log transformation of sentence length. This table checks the robustness of the results
of Table 19. Not reported: defendant characteristics, criminal history, case disposition, order of restitution, number of
counts, and sentencing year.
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Table 21: Robustness to Alternative Measure of Ideology for Democratic Appointed Judges
Dependent variable:
Sentence Length
JCS DW-Nominate 114.275∗∗
(45.734)
Judge Age 0.286
(0.490)
Judge Gender 15.533∗
(9.001)
Constant −3,751.792
(4,086.349)
Observations 406
R2 0.396
Adjusted R2 0.376
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: OLS results when dependent variable is sentence length. This table checks the robustness of the results of Table 19
using alternative measures of judicial ideology. Not reported: defendant characteristics, criminal history, case disposition,
order of restitution, number of counts, and sentencing year.
Table 22: Amount of Departure by Democratic Judges
Dependent variable:
Max Depart Min Depart
(1) (2)
Ideology (JCS CFscore) −3.768 4.736
(12.150) (10.836)
Judge Age −0.895∗ −0.906∗∗
(0.495) (0.441)
Judge Gender 3.581 3.768
(8.593) (7.663)
Constant 2,916.072 2,102.460
(4,007.425) (3,574.087)
Observations 404 404
R2 0.103 0.104
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.074
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: OLS results where the dependent variables are (1) departure from the final guidelines maximum calculation, and
(2) departure from the final guidelines minimum calculation. This table only includes defendants sentenced by Democrat
appointed judges. Not reported: defendant characteristics, criminal history, case disposition, order of restitution, number
of counts, and sentencing year.
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Table 23: Amount of Departure by Republican Judges
Dependent variable:
Max Depart Min Depart
(1) (2)
Ideology (JCS CFscore) 14.529 14.089
(18.687) (16.655)
Judge Age 0.093 −0.320
(0.562) (0.501)
Judge Gender 4.098 −0.836
(11.861) (10.571)
Constant 6,499.880∗ 3,402.652
(3,750.812) (3,343.090)
Observations 414 414
R2 0.037 0.059
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.029
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: OLS results where the dependent variables are (1) departure from the final guidelines maximum calculation, and (2)
departure from the final guidelines minimum calculation. This table only includes defendants sentenced by Republican
appointed judges. Not reported: defendant characteristics, criminal history, case disposition, order of restitution, number
of counts, and sentencing year.
Table 24: Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimates
Category:
above range below range
(1) (2)
Judge Age −0.090∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗
(0.027) (0.012)
Judge Gender −1.465∗∗∗ 0.431∗
(0.031) (0.235)
JCS CFscore −0.113 −0.108
(0.281) (0.130)
Dem Circuit 0.587∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.215)
Observations 509 509
Akaike Inf. Crit. 806.533 806.533
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Results for the multinomial logistic regression using departure categories as the dependent variable. This sample
drops government sponsored departures, including substantial assistance motions. Not reported: defendant characteris-
tics, criminal history, case disposition, order of restitution, number of counts, and sentencing year.
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Table 25: Odds Ratio for Departures
Category:
above range below range
(1) (2)
Judge Age 0.914∗∗∗ 1.027∗∗
(0.027) (0.012)
Judge Gender 0.231∗∗∗ 1.538∗
(0.031) (0.235)
JCS CFscore 0.893 0.898
(0.281) (0.130)
Dem Circuit 1.799∗∗∗ 2.107∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.215)
Observations 509 509
Akaike Inf. Crit. 806.533 806.533
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Odds ratio for the multinomial logistic regression. Not reported: defendant characteristics, criminal history, case
disposition, order of restitution, number of counts, and sentencing year.
Table 26: Sentencing and Political Alignment
Dependent variable:
Sentence Length Departure from Max Departure from Min
(1) (2) (3)
Judge Age −0.075 −0.585∗ −0.684∗∗
(0.395) (0.349) (0.312)
Judge Gender 5.469 −0.358 −0.422
(7.931) (7.025) (6.278)
Democrat −22.084∗∗ 10.715 6.037
(11.058) (9.753) (8.716)
Democrat Circuit −27.876∗∗∗ 16.826∗∗ 12.027
(9.584) (8.470) (7.569)
Dem x Dem Circuit 23.173∗ −12.938 −8.477
(13.734) (12.127) (10.837)
Constant −6,259.579∗∗ 4,798.973∗ 3,309.979
(3,042.778) (2,685.906) (2,400.228)
Observations 822 818 818
R2 0.319 0.053 0.059
Adjusted R2 0.307 0.035 0.042
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: OLS results where the dependent variables are (1) sentence length, (2) departure from the final guidelines maximum
calculation, and (3) departure from the final guidelines minimum calculation. The dependent variables are conceptualized
in months. Not reported: defendant characteristics, criminal history, case disposition, order of restitution, number of
counts, and sentencing year.
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Table 27: Sentencing and Political Alignment Excluding Government Initiated Departures
Dependent variable:
Sentence Length Departure from Max Departure from Min
(1) (2) (3)
Judge Age −0.174 −1.191∗∗∗ −1.302∗∗∗
(0.563) (0.403) (0.359)
Judge Gender 14.274 −6.570 −6.552
(11.433) (8.232) (7.325)
Democrat −41.353∗∗ −7.486 −13.572
(16.155) (11.555) (10.281)
Democrat Circuit −35.753∗∗ −11.987 −14.832
(14.221) (10.196) (9.072)
Dem x Dem Circuit 36.479∗ 5.935 12.632
(19.919) (14.268) (12.695)
Constant −7,756.152∗ −137.499 −1,030.292
(4,342.242) (3,109.693) (2,766.874)
Observations 499 495 495
R2 0.276 0.099 0.093
Adjusted R2 0.253 0.070 0.065
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: OLS results where the dependent variables is sentence length. Not reported: defendant characteristics, criminal
history, case disposition, order of restitution, number of counts, and sentencing year.
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